Incident Response & Computer Forensics, Third Edition
by Jason T. Luttgens, Matthew Pepe, Kevin Mandia
McGraw-Hill Education
ISBN: 978-0-07-179869-6
Page | Notes |
---|---|
Tandy 1000SX | |
Mandiant | |
industrial espionage | |
data theft | |
Jed Mitten | |
Highlighter log analysis tool | |
NASA | |
computer forensics | |
incident response | |
research and development | |
forensics | |
9/11 | |
USAF | |
Office of Special Investigations (OSI) | |
DoD - Computer Forensics Laboratory | |
Linthicum, Maryland | |
expert witness | |
18th Communications Squadron | |
Kadena Air Base | |
Okinawa, Japan | |
George Mason University | |
computer science | |
Matthew Pepe | |
AFOSI | |
Pentagon | |
subject matter expert | |
Foundstone | |
Trident Data Systems | |
Sytex | |
SCSI, SCSI terminator | |
Kevin Mandia | |
Chief Operating Officer (COO) | |
FireEye | |
7th Communications Group; The Pentagon | |
Ernst and Young | |
Washington | |
Lafayette College | |
Master’s Degree, Bachelor’s Degree | |
The George Washington University | |
Marshall Heilman | |
information security | |
security assessment | |
high tech crime | |
staff sergeant | |
USMC | |
Ryan Kazanciyan | |
penetration testing | |
public sector, private sector | |
law enforcement | |
red team | |
Windows | |
Unix | |
economics | |
Duke University | |
Curtis W. Rose and Associates | |
Columbia, Maryland | |
litigation | |
intrusion response | |
“Real Digital Forensics: Computer Security and Incident Response” | |
“Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigations” | |
“Malware Forensics Field Guide for Windows Systems” | |
“Malware Forensics Field Guide for Linux Systems” | |
“Malware Forensics: Investigating and Analyzing Malicious Code” | |
“SQL Server Forensic Analysis” | |
“Anti-Hacker Toolkit” | |
“Network Security: The Complete Reference” | |
xv | incident response has changed significantly |
incident response used to be a “three to ten host problem” | |
attack surface | |
smash and grab | |
attackers are more patient in 2014 than 2004 | |
dwell time: months to years | |
reconnaissance | |
“attackers know the network as well as the IT department” | |
nation state | |
cybercrime | |
credit card | |
PII | |
attackers and defenders have evolved | |
visibility | |
enterprise-wide | |
intrusions have global and economic impact | |
SVP | |
Chief Legal Officer | |
David Drummond | |
xvi | China |
stock price impact due to incident disclosure | |
Baidu | |
preparation is the most important part of incident response | |
tricks of the trade | |
tools of the trade | |
“Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel” | |
James R. Butler | |
BlackHat | |
Steve Surdu | |
Kris Kendall | |
Ken Bradley | |
Jed Mitten | |
Chuck Willis | |
Kris Harms | |
Bred Padres | |
Ben Rubin | |
Nicholas Harbour | |
David Ross | |
Tony Dell | |
Charles Coe | |
Greg Dominguez | |
Richard Wilkinson | |
Marshall Heilman | |
Ryan Kazanciyan | |
Jeff Hamm | |
Juston Prosco | |
Willi Ballenthin | |
Ryan Benson | |
Nikes Akens | |
Robert Honnies | |
Barry Grundy | |
Danny Mares | |
James Akers | |
John Beers | |
Brandi Shailer | |
Amanda Russell | |
Amy Jollymore | |
xix | Ponemon Institute |
cost of cybercrime in 2013 | |
average cost of an incident: $1 million | |
average time to resolve an incident: 32 days | |
CIO | |
xx | malware triage |
evidence | |
remediation | |
report writing | |
future proof | |
incidents are invevitable | |
detection | |
data collection | |
xxi | Microsoft Windows |
Apple OS X | |
4 | organizations are complacent/reckless in regards to cybercrime |
cost of doing business | |
Carl Sagan | |
CSRC - Computer Security Resource Center | |
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology | |
NIST Special Publication 800-61 | |
event definition: “any observable occurrence in a system or network” | |
incident definition: “violation or threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices” | |
email spam | |
embezzlement | |
5 | Xbox |
USDOJ | |
Cornell University | |
“What is Incident Response” | |
6 | case study |
ACL - Access Control List | |
Java | |
malware | |
sophisticated attacker | |
hashing | |
digital certificate | |
persistence mechanism | |
7 | live response |
storage and the nature of computer systems has changed how incident response is performed | |
CIA triad | |
public relations | |
Hippocrates | |
8 | why care about incident response? |
cryptography | |
scope | |
cyber espionage | |
VPN | |
9 | SQL injection |
DMZ | |
xp_cmdshell stored procedure | |
local administrator privileges | |
backdoor | |
cracking password hashes | |
keylogger | |
domain controller | |
antivirus evasion | |
10 | tunneling |
RDP | |
command and control | |
DLL search order hijacking | |
DNS C2 traffic | |
proxy | |
attacking sysadmins | |
file share enumeration | |
“juicy” file shares | |
credential theft | |
data exfiltration | |
FTP | |
11 | Zip, RAR, CAB files |
compression | |
jump server | |
Payment Card Industry (PCI) | |
CVV/CVV2 | |
black market | |
credit card fraud | |
12 | Domain Administrator (DA) |
extracting password hashes from memory | |
Internet | |
port 88 | |
mail exchanger | |
13 | Sysinternals PsSuite |
pslist | |
memory dump | |
RAR - multipart | |
PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) | |
Point of Sale (PoS) | |
tokenization | |
end-to-end encryption (E2EE) | |
14 | process injection |
regular expression | |
track2 data | |
hashing to prevent data duplication | |
RC4 | |
hard-coded key | |
malware killswitch/mutex | |
sysadmin noticed strange traffic on port 80 to a foreign country | |
initial triage | |
containment | |
eradication | |
network traffic analysis | |
15 | PE, ELF |
spear phishing | |
Adobe Acrobat vulnerabilities | |
Gh0stRAT | |
RAT | |
16 | 2FA - Two Factor Authentication |
attacker determined user was an engineer, worked from home, and enumerated installed software | |
mimikatz | |
backup access/multi-tiered persistence | |
Security Event Log - actual hostname and IP of attacker | |
VPN pool | |
geolocation | |
Texas | |
Outlook Web Access (OWA) | |
17 | attacker modified file ACLs |
local admin password reuse across environment | |
Windows defrag tool as anti-forensics | |
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) | |
users logging in from multiple IPs/hosts as a detection | |
IP address as attacker attribution/scoping incident | |
enterprise-wide password reset | |
18 | recursive directory listing |
19 | attack lifecycle |
20 | initial compromise |
social engineering | |
public-facing vulnerabilities | |
establishing a foothold | |
shellcode | |
attackers downloading extra tools | |
privilege escalation | |
pass the hash (PtH) | |
internal reconnaissance | |
21 | lateral movement |
network shares as lateral movement | |
Task Scheduler lateral movement | |
PsExec lateral movement | |
radmin lateral movement | |
RDP, Dameware, VNC lateral movement | |
maintaining persistence | |
webshell | |
backdooring legitimate applications | |
22 | hindsight is 20/20 |
24 | preparing for an incident |
most incident responses are non-technical | |
core principles of incident response are the same as non-technical investigations | |
buzzword | |
marketing hype | |
what is a security incident | |
importance of scoping an incident response | |
organizations need to define what a “computer security incident” means to them | |
vulnerability scan | |
act of god | |
25 | backup media |
phone | |
printer | |
building access card | |
2FA token | |
tablet | |
computers are everywhere | |
extortion | |
spyware | |
goals of incident response | |
damage assessment | |
26 | who is involved in the incident response process? |
CISO | |
CIO | |
incident manager | |
incident commander | |
27 | security posture |
European Union (EU) | |
PCI, HIPAA, FISMA, NERC | |
28 | finding incident response talent |
cost of maintaining an incident response team | |
outsourcing | |
Fortune 50 | |
29 | hiring incident response talent |
Forensic Focus message board | |
30 | network traffic analysis |
artifact | |
log file analysis | |
need to write well for reports | |
sandbox | |
certifications with periodic re-testing | |
31 | the incident response process: initial response, investigation, remediation |
leads | |
CFO | |
banking trojan | |
incident response will look different based on the circumstances | |
32 | “Maybe its best not to act quickly” |
33 | “shiny objects” |
34 | characteristics of good leads: relevant, detailed, actionable |
IoC pronunciation: eye-oh-see | |
OpenIOC | |
Cybox | |
Yara | |
MITRE | |
35 | Visual Basic |
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) | |
Snort | |
Redline | |
lack of enterprise-grade or mature solutions for IoC formatting | |
36 | systems of interest |
initial triage: validate, categorize, prioritize | |
false positive | |
37 | evidence preservation |
imaging | |
volatile data | |
live response | |
memory collection | |
volume of data may be prohibitive | |
rootkit | |
38 | limits of memory analysis |
forensic disk imaging | |
39 | “CSI effect” |
40 | posturing: extra steps taken with remediation to ensure the success of remediation |
tactical remediation | |
strategic remediation | |
tracking investigative data and information | |
41 | lists: collected evidence, impacted systems, files of interest, accessed and stolen data, attacker activity, IoCs, ongoing tasks and asks |
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet | |
RTIR - bestpractical.com | |
42 | reporting |
46 | big data |
identifying risk | |
policies conducive towards successful incident response | |
47 | corporate reputation |
48 | Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) |
security policy | |
remote access policy | |
Internet usage policy | |
privacy | |
SANS | |
ISO 27002:2005 | |
Service Level Agreement (SLA) | |
49 | privacy and labor regulations |
team coordination: timezones, handoffs | |
user education | |
awareness training | |
50 | FTP |
51 | attackers eavesdropping on incident response communication |
COMSEC | |
email encryption: S/MIME, PGP | |
data labeling and classification | |
52 | monitor conference call participants |
case numbers | |
project codenames | |
IDS | |
voicemail | |
public relations | |
53 | deliverables |
54 | Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute |
Perdue University College of Technology | |
Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute | |
incident response team hardware | |
full disk encryption | |
self-encrypting drive | |
TrueCrypt | |
McAfee Endpoint Protection | |
55 | USB thumb drive |
SATA | |
laptop | |
56 | virtual machines for analysis |
PATA, SCSI, SAS, eSATA | |
write blocker | |
mobile device forensics equipment | |
UPS | |
rack mount | |
Torx bit | |
spudger | |
specialized case opening tools | |
57 | FreeBSD, Linux |
SecurityOnion | |
Easy-IDS | |
58 | forensically sound |
Frye test | |
case law | |
Daubert vs. Merell-Dow Pharmaceuticals | |
Kumho Tire Co et all vs. Carmichael et all | |
Doubert standard | |
59 | Backtrack, CAINE, Helix |
boot disk: CD, USB, … | |
live media | |
operating system | |
virtual machine snapshots | |
NIST Computer Forensic Tool Testing | |
60 | evidence handling |
MD5 | |
internal knowledge repository | |
search engine | |
61 | server, desktop, laptop |
62 | DISA STIGs |
HIPS | |
asset management | |
63 | provision date |
database | |
MAC | |
DHCP | |
64 | HP-UX |
whitelisting/allowlisting, blacklisting/blocklisting | |
mass password change difficulties | |
65 | NTLM |
LanMan | |
rainbow table | |
fgdump | |
rcracki_mt | |
registry key | |
instrumentation | |
event, error, and access logs | |
where are the logs? what’s in the logs? | |
logging and timezones | |
Splunk | |
ELSA | |
Snare - InterSect Alliance | |
NTSyslog | |
ArcSight | |
RSA enVision | |
66 | log retention |
logon and logoff events | |
size of log files | |
forwarding logs to a centralized log collector | |
DNS query logging | |
DHCP lease assignment logs | |
antivirus, IDS, and firewall logs | |
custom application logs | |
67 | quarantine |
sending malicious or unknown samples to a security vendor | |
be wary of submitting samples to antivirus sites | |
Access Data Enterprise | |
Guidance Software enCase Enterprise | |
Mandiant Intelligent Response | |
rolling your own tools | |
68 | patching |
remove local administrator permissions from users | |
ensure security software is deployed and functioning as intended | |
decommission EOL devices and systems | |
NSA IA mitigation guidence | |
network segmentation | |
network documentation | |
69 | ERP - Enterprise Resource Planning |
NAC - Network Access Control | |
71 | Microsoft RPC |
VLAN | |
LDAP | |
Active Directory | |
IMAPS, HTTPS | |
network switch | |
72 | JSON |
database replication | |
73 | defense in depth |
sensor | |
fault tree analysis | |
limiting workstation communication | |
edge, switching devices | |
74 | border router |
proxy-aware malware | |
default route | |
honeypot | |
routing blackhole | |
penetration test | |
incident response tabletop | |
MPLS | |
75 | router |
network configuration change control and revision control | |
full content capture | |
SPAN | |
network tap | |
static route | |
76 | NetFlow emitter |
FBI | |
DNS blackhole | |
zone file | |
77 | packet capture |
BIND | |
82 | Alexander Pope |
Hurricane Sandy | |
NYSE | |
detection | |
Ferris Bueller’s Day Off | |
84 | local time |
UTC | |
difficulties with time zones and incident response | |
using UTC is the best | |
incident response checklists | |
checklist | |
84 | RTIR - Request Tracker for Incident Response |
Microsoft Active Directory Forest | |
Incident Summary Checklist: | |
- time and date of report | |
- time and date of detection | |
- contact info of reporter | |
- contact info of responder | |
- contact info of person who detected the incident | |
85 | - nature of incident |
- how it was detected | |
- identifiers and locations of affected systems | |
- who accessed systems after detection | |
- who is aware of the incident? | |
- is the incident ongoing? | |
- who needs to know? | |
often, checklists “solve” an incident by simply filling it out and being thorough | |
skepticism | |
89 | case notes |
90 | timelines, attack timelines, incident timelines |
91 | proof, legal context |
elements of proof | |
92 | setting expectations |
93 | warez |
win.ini | |
/etc/hosts | |
96 | artifact |
leads of value, definition | |
97 | NAT |
brittle lead | |
MD5 | |
98 | mutex |
registry key | |
exes in \Windows\Help\ | |
99 | XML |
100 | “Practical Malware Analysis” |
host-based indicator | |
102 | packer |
manual function import | |
loose attribution | |
103 | sethc.exe replacement attack (Sticky Keys) |
104 | pseudo code |
105 | Image File Execution Options (IFEO) |
106 | network-based indicator |
107 | DNS cache |
RFC 1035 | |
108 | QNAME |
Snort | |
case-insensitive | |
109 | tcpdump |
Windows XP | |
Wireshark | |
NAT | |
URL | |
111 | dropper |
Microsoft Word | |
staged malware | |
112 | MRU registry key |
“Data Common to Environment” | |
113 | Perl |
resolving internal and external leads | |
114 | subpoena |
legal discovery | |
reporting incidents to law enforcement | |
State Department | |
115 | Infraguard |
FS-ISAC | |
DIB-CS/IA | |
118 | triage imaging |
phishing | |
119 | trust but verify |
SQL | |
WWWWWH | |
120 | gathering preliminary evidence |
registry keys, files, etc related to malware | |
network artifact | |
independent evidence sources | |
Windows Prefetch | |
121 | determining course of action |
123 | advanced query monitoring - databases |
insider threat | |
packet capture | |
124 | SQL query |
spam | |
125 | DHCP |
DHCP logs, DNS query logs | |
126 | misconceptions of insider threats |
127 | corporate spyware |
128 | witch hunt |
Automated Clearing House (ACH) | |
fraud | |
CEO, CFO | |
online banking | |
MAC address | |
conference room | |
wireless network | |
unauthorized banking transfer | |
129 | Zeus banking malware |
recently installed executables | |
136 | live data collection |
live response (LR) | |
full drive duplication | |
RFC 3227 - Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving | |
when to perform live response | |
137 | live response pitfalls |
USB drive | |
DOS batch script | |
Microsoft DOS | |
138 | bash script |
BSD | |
selecting live response tools | |
139 | CSV, TSV, XML |
140 | marketing propaganda |
what should a live response tool collect? | |
141 | collection best practices |
143 | access control |
air gapping | |
root user | |
sudo | |
Windows Vista | |
Windows 7 | |
UAC | |
Run As Administrator | |
CD-ROM, DVD | |
SMB, CIFS, NFS | |
144 | cryptcat |
Apple OS X | |
automation decreases human error | |
automation can be worse than human error | |
being keylogged while carrying out incident response | |
145 | Mandiant Redline |
Windows Server 2003 | |
Windows Server 2008 | |
live collection can be expensive in both costs and resources | |
146 | MSI |
Redline Collector | |
148 | 32 and 64 bit versions of tools |
149 | systeminfo |
net user | |
net group | |
ipconfig /all | |
route print | |
arp -a | |
ipconfig /displaydns | |
netstat -aln | |
Diamond CS openports | |
autoruns | |
pslist | |
logparser | |
Nirsoft DriverView | |
Nirsoft OpenedFilesView | |
PC-Tools md5sums | |
hashutils | |
150 | MS-DOS |
VBScript | |
Perl | |
Python | |
interpreted language | |
checksum | |
memory collection | |
151 | full memory dump |
AccessData FTK Imager Lite | |
Mantech MDD | |
Mandiant Memoryze | |
Moonsols Windows Memory Toolkit | |
msiexec | |
incident response OPSEC | |
MemoryDD.bat | |
154 | Microsoft userdump |
Microsoft procdump | |
Ntsecurity.nu pmdump | |
ProcessDD.bat | |
155 | LINRes |
Network Intelligence India | |
overhead of maintaining Unix live response toolkits | |
156 | The Apple Examiner |
date command | |
dpkg –get-selections | |
Debian | |
RPM | |
rpm -qa | |
BSD pkg_info | |
OSX: /Library/Receipts/InstallHistory.plist | |
mount command | |
df | |
fdisk -l | |
cat /etc/issue | |
uname -a | |
w command | |
cron | |
/var/spool/cron | |
init system | |
uptime | |
kernel version | |
installed software | |
157 | services |
/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow | |
/etc/group | |
ifconfig -a | |
netstat -rn | |
arp -a | |
lsmod | |
kldstat | |
kexstat | |
lsof | |
ps auxwwwem | |
/etc | |
/var/log | |
/var/adm | |
/Private/var/log | |
.bash_history | |
shell history | |
find command | |
md5 command | |
md5sum command | |
158 | IRIX |
Solaris | |
dd | |
ddfldd | |
/dev/mem | |
LKM | |
LiME - Linux Memory Extractor | |
Ubuntu, CentOS, Debian, openSUSE | |
159 | tarball |
Linux kernel headers | |
insmod | |
netcat file transfer | |
160 | FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD |
dc3dd | |
BSD ports | |
pkg_add | |
sysctl | |
EOF | |
hw.physmem64 | |
161 | 4kb chunks for performance |
NFS share | |
Memoryze for Mac | |
Mac Memory Reader | |
ATC-NY | |
162 | /proc/PID/mem |
gcore | |
core dump | |
gdb | |
166 | forensic duplication |
simple duplication | |
167 | SSD |
hard drive sector | |
Host Protected Area | |
Drive Configuration Overlay (DCO) | |
SSD load leveling | |
SSD error detection | |
NIST - Computer Forensics Tools Verification | |
CFTT | |
forensic image formats | |
168 | complete disk image |
OEM | |
Dell | |
HP | |
RAID | |
partition | |
169 | SEC filing |
MacBook Pro | |
attacker downgrading OS and software as anti-forensics | |
170 | partition image |
slack space | |
unallocated space | |
logical image | |
NAS | |
SAN | |
171 | FTK Imager |
enCase | |
VMX, VMDK, VMSS files | |
image integrity | |
bad sector | |
hard drive firmware | |
AFF format - Advanced Forensic Framework | |
Expert Witness Format (EWF) | |
ASR Data SMART | |
MD5, SHA1 | |
172 | E01 files - enCase |
Andrew Rosen | |
173 | traditional duplication; computer powered off |
hardware write blocker | |
ASIC | |
174 | SATA, PATA, FireWire, eSATA |
WibeTech Forensic UltraDock | |
175 | mounting read only may still alter data on the drive |
replaying journals | |
repairing inconsistencies | |
176 | DCFL |
DC3 - Defense Cyber Crime Center | |
Backtrack | |
Ultimate Boot CD | |
POSIX | |
/mnt | |
177 | auto mount |
diskarbitrationd | |
178 | live system duplication |
risks of live duplication | |
mSATA | |
180 | MacBook Air |
ZIF ribbon connector | |
PowerBook | |
Target Disk Mode | |
ThunderBolt | |
Tableau LLC | |
181 | duplicating virtual machines |
memory snapshots of virtual machines | |
184 | SPAN |
network monitoring | |
egress point monitoring | |
tactical sensor | |
185 | Sourcefire |
Snort | |
RSA NetWitness | |
NIDS | |
event-based alert | |
Suricata | |
186 | too many rules may bog down NIDS systems |
Snort output plugins | |
alert_fast | |
ASCII | |
Mandiant APT1 report | |
fake SSL certificate | |
187 | header logging, full packet logging |
raw packets | |
tcpdump | |
199 | W Richard Stevens TCP/IP Illustrated |
Ethernet frame | |
IPv4 header | |
TCP header | |
statistical modeling | |
NetFlow | |
Fluke | |
HP | |
SolarWinds | |
IBM | |
argus | |
flow-tools | |
189 | ragraph Argus command |
191 | laptops or 1U servers as network monitoring hardware |
192 | appropriate hardware for network monitoring |
Solera Networks | |
193 | NTOP |
PF_RING | |
AF_PACKET | |
“Comparing and Improving Current Packet Capturing Solutions Based on Commodity Hardware” 2010 | |
“Packet Capture in 10-Gigabit Ethernet Environments Using Contemporary Commodity Hardware” 2007 | |
DeepSea appliance | |
SecurityOnion | |
194 | Xubuntu |
ISO image | |
195 | choke point |
VLAN trunking | |
VLAN tag | |
IPSec | |
MPLS | |
Tripwire | |
196 | evaluating network sensors |
C, Lua | |
Wireshark decoder | |
198 | Wireshark statistics |
ftp-data port 20 | |
199 | Wireshark “Follow Stream” |
extracting files from FTP packet captures with Wireshark | |
204 | fgdump password dump tool |
205 | MySQL |
Apache | |
SQL injection | |
SSL decryption with Wireshark | |
208 | sqlmap User-Agent |
209 | net view |
tasklist /v | |
tree command | |
210 | attacker adding a user |
attacker adding user to Administrators group | |
211 | nmap |
NetWitness Investigator | |
213 | collecting logs from network events |
chain of custody | |
216 | DHCP RFC 2131 |
217 | Microsoft DHCP |
Microsoft Technet | |
218 | %WINDIR%\System32\Dhcp\ |
Server 2012 | |
219 | Server 2003 R2 |
DHCP enabled by default | |
DhcpSrvLog<day>.log | |
ISC DHCP | |
syslog, syslog-ng, rsyslog | |
DHCPDISCOVER | |
DHCPOFFER | |
/etc/syslog.conf, /etc/rsyslog.conf, /etc/syslogng.conf | |
220 | DNS: RFC 1034, RFC 1035 |
parked hostnames | |
221 | localhost 127.0.0.1 |
ISC Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) | |
named.conf.local | |
query logging with BIND | |
IPv6 AAAA | |
222 | ANSWER section |
Microsoft DNS | |
Debug Logging - query logging | |
223 | %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\Dns\dns.txt |
truncated on reset or overflow | |
224 | DNSCAP |
LANDesk | |
Symantec Altiris Client Management Suite | |
Software License Monitoring (SLM) | |
226 | LANDesk registry keys |
SOFTWARE hive | |
REG_BINARY | |
REG_SZ | |
REG_DWORD | |
Python script for converting LANDesk timestamps | |
227 | SLM Browser |
RegRipper - landesk.pl | |
Justin Prosco | |
Willi Ballenthin - Python registry library | |
Windows Recycle Bin | |
228 | Application Metering |
search for suspicious executions of net.exe. net1.exe, cmd.exe, at.exe, … | |
TSU | |
AeXAMInventory.txt | |
230 | antivirus quarantine |
Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) | |
logfile location | |
233 | SEP quarantine location |
VBN extension | |
QExtract | |
pyqextract.py - Jamaal Speights | |
XOR: 0x5a, 0xa5 | |
McAfee Virus Scan Enterprise | |
234 | log locations |
McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) | |
235 | McAfee Virusscan quarantine location |
BUP extension | |
OLE file format | |
OLECF | |
7-Zip | |
hex editor | |
McAfee FileInsight | |
236 | Trend Micro Office Scan |
log file: pccnt35.log | |
238 | VSEncode.exe |
hacktivist | |
IIS | |
239 | HTTP RFC 2616 |
virtual host | |
240 | Apache |
241 | Apache config and log locations |
access.log | |
CustomLog, ErrorLog directives | |
content locations: DocumentRoot | |
X-Forwarded-For | |
Apache Common Log Format | |
NSCA extended/combined log | |
242 | Microsoft IIS |
config location | |
Windows NT 3.51 SP3 | |
IIS Express | |
243 | IIS log locations |
W3C Extended Log File Format | |
UTF-8 Unicode | |
IIS7 | |
244 | database server |
245 | MS-SQL, MySQL, Oracle |
“SQL Server Forensic Analysis” Kewie Fowler | |
databases are fragile and brittle | |
246 | MSSQL Server Management Studio (SSMS) |
MSSQL log locations | |
247 | .mdf, .ldf file formats |
MySQL config locations, log locations | |
my.cnf, my.conf | |
query logging has unreasonable overhead | |
248 | MyISAM |
InnoDB | |
Oracle SQL server configuration, log locations | |
254 | Neil deGrasse Tyson |
scientific method | |
255 | fallacy of proving negatives |
256 | .pst file |
technology changes fast, but fundamentals change slowly | |
257 | PDA |
location of data | |
virtual desktop | |
258 | backups |
Carbonite, Mozy, Dropbox. Google Drive | |
NTFS, HFS+ | |
plist file | |
NTFS stream | |
VFS inode | |
HFS resource fork | |
File Allocation Table FAT16 FAT32 | |
“File System Forensic Analysis” - Brian Carrier | |
259 | data handling policy |
260 | Credent full disk encryption |
FDE - Full Disk Encryption | |
261 | FUSE |
uu encoding | |
265 | NSRL |
268 | string/keyword searching |
foremost | |
file carving | |
269 | sanity check |
273 | dead disk forensics |
MFT - Master File Table | |
274 | Windows Explorer |
$MFT | |
512 byte sectors | |
MFT entry | |
%LogFile | |
Active/Inactive flag (NTFS) | |
$STANDARD_INFORMATION | |
$FILENAME | |
$DATA | |
advanced format (AF) | |
FILE_RECORD_SEGMENT_HEADER | |
275 | identifying deleted files |
276 | MACE timestamps |
$SIA, $SI | |
STANDARD_INFORMATION | |
FNA, $FN, FILE_NAME | |
277 | Sleuth Kit |
Entry Modified timestamp | |
filename created | |
MS-DOS 8.3 filename | |
time stomping | |
anti-forensics, counter-forensics | |
SetMACE | |
278 | $FN MACE is difficult to do without direct MFT access |
raw disk access | |
double time stomping | |
Windows Vista | |
279 | files copied from media may preserve timestamps |
SANS DFIR posters | |
contiguous data | |
fragmented data | |
resident data | |
280 | MFT entry: 1024 bytes |
ADS - Alternate Data Streams | |
dir /r | |
type command and ADS | |
281 | Poison Ivy backdoor |
SysInternals streams | |
LADS - Frank Heyne | |
282 | X-Ways Forensics |
Zone.Identifier | |
MSDN - “Known Alternate Stream Names” | |
mft2csv | |
analyzeMFT | |
Plaso | |
log2timeline | |
INDX attributes | |
283 | B+ tree |
$130 | |
INDEX_ROOT | |
INDEX_ALLOCATION | |
INDX - 4096 byte chunks | |
physical size vs logical size | |
%TEMP% | |
working directory | |
284 | “Striking Gold Incident Response NTFS INDX Buffers” - Mandiant |
INDXParse | |
285 | NTFS Change Logs |
journaled file system | |
$Logfile | |
$UsnJrnl | |
$LogFile - typically 64Mb | |
USN - Update Sequence Number | |
\$Extend\$UsnJrnl | |
Index/Search Service | |
File Replication Service | |
286 | fsutil |
LogFileParser | |
TZWorks Journal Parser | |
parser-usnjrnl | |
Volume Shadow Copies - VSC | |
NT Backup Service | |
System Restore Point | |
287 | default VSC snapshot size: 5% of volume size on Windows 7, 16% on Vista+ |
system restore scheduled tasks | |
registry hive | |
vssadmin list shadows /for=VolumeLetter | |
mklink /D target_dir shadow_copy_volume | |
libvshadow | |
Shadow Explorer | |
VSCToolkit | |
288 | WoW64 |
File System Redirector | |
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\ | |
%SYSTEMROOT%\SysWOW64\ | |
Microsoft Developer Network | |
289 | Program Files |
Prefetch | |
Windows Cache Manager | |
%SYSTEMROOT%\Prefetch\ | |
.pf extension | |
Layout.ini | |
290 | C:\Windows\Prefetch\ |
SyperFetch | |
AgAppLaunch database | |
https://blog.rewolf.pl/blog/?p=214 | |
291 | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PreFetchParameters |
enabling Prefetcher | |
hashing AppList | |
dllhost.exe | |
mmc.exe | |
rundll32.exe | |
Hexacorn - Prefetch Hash Calculator | |
292 | NTOSBOOT Prefetch file |
“10 second rule” | |
NirSoft WinPrefetchView | |
bulk acquisition of Prefetch in investigations | |
293 | Last Run Time |
Last Modified Time | |
Forensics Wiki | |
TZWorks Prefetch Parser | |
RedWolf Forensics Prefetch Parser | |
294 | Event Logs |
Application, System, Security | |
XP/2003: %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\Config | |
.evt, .evtx extensions | |
295 | Vista+: %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\WinevtLogs |
AppLocker, UAC, Terminal Services logs | |
EIDS | |
https://www.myeventlog.com | |
https://www.eventid.net | |
296 | Logon events |
Logon Types: 2: interactive, 3: network, 4: batch, 6: service, 6: proxy, 7: unlock, 8: network cleartext, 9: new credentials, 10: remote interactive, 11: cache interactive | |
298 | LogonProcess: NtlmSsp, Kerberos, User32, Advapi |
Authentication Package: NTLM, Negotiate, Kerberos | |
Workstation Name | |
Source Network Address | |
VNC | |
lateral movement | |
299 | Event ID 4688 |
301 | Process Tracking, Detailed Tracking, Process Auditing |
GPO | |
302 | Volume of 4688 events |
Maximum Security Event Log setting | |
SCM - Service Control Manager | |
PsExec | |
Event IDs 7035, 7036 | |
Windows Credential Editor | |
hash replay | |
antivirus alerts in Event Logs | |
Event Viewer | |
FixEVT | |
304 | PsLogList |
Log Parser - SQL queries on Event Logs | |
Event Log Explorer | |
LfLe | |
python-evtx | |
Plaso | |
305 | Event Logs are UTC, Event Viewer is local time |
Scheduled Tasks | |
Task Scheduler | |
at.exe | |
schtasks.exe | |
Management Console snap-in | |
attackers use scheduled task to avoild using helpers such as psexec | |
at.exe usage | |
306 | at.exe on remote systems |
at.exe runs tasks as SYSTEM | |
at.exe privesc | |
deleting at jobs | |
307 | schtasks.exe usage |
.job files | |
%SYSTEMROOT%\Tasks\ | |
Vista+ dont delete .job files on success, but are cleared when Task Scheduler restarts or the system reboots | |
Task Scheduler log locations: 2000,2003,XP: %SYSTEMROOT%\SchLgU.txt, Vista+: %SYSTEMROOT%\Tasks\SchedLgU.txt | |
Task Scheduler Event Logs: Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler%4Operational | |
wevtutil - enable Task Scheduler logs | |
308 | analyzing .job files |
jobparser.py - Jamie Levy | |
310 | timestamps of .job files - last execution |
Registry Key timestamps | |
311 | cscript.exe |
cmd.exe to execute files obfuscation | |
312 | Event IDs: 10, 140, 319, 100, 200, 129, 201, 202 |
313 | Windows Registry |
registry key, value, hive | |
314 | registry live locations: SYSTEM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE_SAM, DEFAULT, NTUSER.DAT, USRCLASS.DAT |
315 | Cygwin |
regedit.exe | |
reg.exe | |
316 | registry hive mappings: HKLM, HKU, HKCU, HKCC, HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT |
SID - Security Identifier | |
CurrentControlSet | |
317 | registry timestamps |
registry subkey | |
no created or accessed timestamps! | |
keys only! not values | |
Last Write Time | |
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | |
runkeys as persistence | |
caveats of LastWriteTime | |
318 | SetRegTime - Joakim Schicht |
Registry Reflection | |
Registry Redirection | |
Wow6432Node | |
“Registry Keys Affected by View64” - MSDN | |
319 | “Registry Reflection” - MSDN |
System Configuration registry keys | |
ShimCache | |
common autorun registry keys | |
user hive registry keys | |
Control Panel | |
320 | table of registry entries |
322 | “How to Determine Audit Policies From the Registry” |
“Well-Known SIDs” | |
ShimCache/Application Compatibility Cache | |
registry location of ShimCache: XP, Vista+ | |
advantages of ShimCache over Prefetch | |
323 | “Leveraging the Application Compatibility Cache in Forensics Investigations” |
Andrew Davis | |
ShimCacheParser.py | |
Mandiant ShimCache whitepaper | |
324 | there are hundreds of autorun keys |
autostart extensitility points | |
persistence mechanism keys | |
Windows Services | |
Local System, Network Service, Local Service | |
325 | HLKM\CurrentControlSet\Service\<Servicename> |
* Microsoft Service Key value documentation * | |
326 | svchost.exe |
ServiceMain | |
ServiceDLL | |
ImagePath | |
327 | sc query |
sq queryex | |
sc start, stop, create | |
* sc.exe documentation * | |
Service Management snapin services.msc | |
328 | sc/Service Manager do not allow editing of ServiceDLL; use regedit.exe |
tasklist /svc | |
Volatility Framework | |
Run, RunOnce keys | |
* common locations * | |
329 | Active Setup |
Windows 98 | |
* registry key locations * | |
malware re-using GUIDs with Active Setup | |
Googling GUIDs | |
StubPath - Active Setup | |
PoisonIvy using Active Setup persistence | |
331 | AppInit_DLLs |
user32.dll | |
* registry locations * | |
Windows 7+ requires signed AppInit_DLLs | |
LSA Packages | |
Local Security Authority (LSA) | |
* registry locations * | |
malware doesnt need to implenent LSA functionality | |
msv1_0 - NTLM local and domain | |
Kerberos | |
wdigest - digest authentication | |
tspkg - Terminal Services SSO | |
notification packages - when passwords are set or changed | |
FPNWCLNT - File and Print Services for NetWare | |
RASSFM - Remote Access Subauthentication | |
KDCSVC - Kerberos Key Distribution Center Service | |
scecli - Security Configuration Engine Client | |
* Microsoft Documentation * | |
332 | LSA as persistence |
Browser Helper Object (BHO) | |
Internet Explorer | |
adware, scamware | |
COM - Component Object Model | |
CLSID - Class ID * registry location * | |
search Google for CLSIDs | |
IE7+ - Manage Add-Ons | |
Shell Extensions - “BHOs for Explorer” | |
333 | blacklisting CLSIDs |
“Registering Shell Extension Handlers” | |
WinloginGINA | |
GinaDLL * registry location * | |
GINA DLL MiTM | |
WinLogin Notification * registry location * | |
winlogin.exe | |
screen saver | |
screen lock | |
WinLoginNotify eliminated in Vista+ | |
334 | Winlogin Shell * registry location * |
Winlogin Userinit * registry location * | |
WinLogin persistence | |
key-value pairs | |
Identifying Malicious AutoRuns: typos, weird paths, problems with this approach | |
335 | hijacking legitimate services |
look for unsigned DLLs/exes | |
look for timestamps within incident timeline | |
336 | Bit9 File Advisor - known good |
malware signing binaries | |
stolen code signing certificates | |
338 | Shellbags * registry location * |
339 | shellbags.py |
340 | Dan Bullega Shellbags blog |
“Usint Shellbags information to reconstruct user activities” - Zhu, Gladyshev, James | |
“Computer Forensic Artifacts Windows 7 Shellbags” | |
Chad Tillbury | |
SANS Shellbags blog | |
TZworks sbag | |
UserAssist * registry location * | |
LNK file | |
Start Menu | |
Run menu | |
341 | ROT13 - UserAssist |
Nirsoft UserAssistView | |
Didier Stevens - UserAssist | |
MUI Cache | |
342 | MUICache * registry location * |
NirSoft MUICacheView | |
343 | MRU - Most Recently Used keys * registry location * |
Explorer Open and Save MRU | |
ComDlg32 | |
OpenSavePid1MRU | |
OpenSaveMRU | |
LastVisitedPid1MRU | |
344 | CIDSizeMRU |
Harlan Carvey - RegRipper | |
Start Menu Run MRU * registry location * | |
RecentDocs * registry location * | |
LNK files for recents | |
345 | Internet Explorer TypedURLs/TypedPaths * registry locations * |
links, bookmarks | |
doesn’t track clicks of links or bookmarks | |
The Digital Forensics Stream Blog | |
UNC path | |
346 | Remote Desktop MRU * registry location * |
Terminal Services / Server Client | |
347 | Windows Registry Decoder |
AutoRuns | |
autorunsc | |
348 | UserAssist - Didier Stevens |
349 | NirSoft registry tools * link * |
350 | Recent Documents |
LNK file analysis | |
351 | TZWorks lp |
Simple File Parser - Google | |
Jump Lists - added in Windows 7 | |
taskbar | |
Microsoft Outlook | |
JumpLister - WoanWare | |
JumpList file paths | |
353 | analyzing Recycle Bin artifacts |
Vista+ changed Recycle Bin format | |
$I, $R files | |
INFO2 files | |
356 | Recycle Bin should never contain normal files beyond desktop.ini |
rifiutil2 | |
memory forensics | |
357 | page file |
physical memory | |
FIrewire IEEE 1394 - direct memory access | |
358 | page file locations |
359 | crash dump |
kernel memory dump | |
360 | minidump * filesystem locations * |
complete memory dump * filesystem locations * | |
memory.dmp | |
WIndows Error Reporting * registry * | |
Moonsols Windows Memory Toolkit | |
WinDbg | |
Hibernation Files * filesystem locations * | |
hiberfil.sys | |
Volatility image copy plugin | |
361 | memory analysis |
EPROCESS blocks - Executive Process | |
SID to username mapping blog * | |
362 | Handles |
SysInternals handle, Process Explorer | |
Zeus malware | |
363 | mutex/mutant |
Zeus usage of mutants | |
PoisonIvy usage of mutants | |
364 | Virtual Access Descriptor (VAD) trees |
Dolan Gavitt VAD blog * | |
Windows Process Loader | |
366 | crss.exe - Client Server System Runtime |
strings in memory | |
LSASS dump from memory - mimikatz | |
Pagefile.sys analysis | |
367 | * pagefile registry settings * |
process injection | |
CreateRemoteThread/LoadLibrary | |
368 | hooking |
SetWindowsHookEx keylogger | |
GetAsyncKeystroke keylogger | |
369 | IAT hooking |
IDT hooking | |
SSDT hooking | |
System Service Dispatch Table | |
Kernel Patch Protection (KPP) | |
PatchGuard | |
Volatility apihooks plugin | |
HttpSendRequestA | |
wininet.dll | |
370 | DumpIt |
371 | Scheduled Tasks persistence |
Conficker - unnamed scheduled tasks | |
.job files | |
system binary modification | |
373 | Windows File Protection (WFP) |
Windows Resource Protection (WRP) | |
Sticky Keys | |
IFEO - Image File Execution Options | |
sethc.exe | |
Accessibility Features | |
DLL load order hijacking / search order hijacking | |
ntshrui.dll persistence | |
DLL proxying/passthrough | |
376 | * sources of evidence * |
382 | macOS / Mac OS X |
Spotlight | |
HFS+ | |
383 | HFS+ Volume layout |
HFS+ Boot Blocks | |
Finder | |
System folder | |
HFS+ Volume Header, Alternative Volume Header | |
384 | iBored |
385 | Volume Header Structure * |
386 | GMT time |
387 | Allocation file, Extents Overflow file, Catalog file, Attributes file, … Startup file |
named for | |
B-tree | |
CNID - Catalog Node ID | |
plist format | |
388 | Safari |
xattr -lr * | |
“MDItem reference” | |
com.apple.metadata | |
389 | Spotlight |
Application Bundles | |
mdfind | |
Mac OS X Lion | |
Managed Storage | |
390 | sqlite3 |
SQLite Manager | |
392 | /Applications, /Developer, /Library, /System |
393 | /Network, /Users |
MacPorts | |
BSD ports | |
“File System Programming Guide” | |
394 | /Applications |
Application Bundles | |
.app | |
.framework | |
.plugin | |
.kext | |
Finder - Show Package COntents | |
VMWare Fusion | |
Console | |
Help Bundle | |
XCode | |
397 | plutil |
/System domain | |
/User domain | |
398 | NeXTStep |
Sun NIS+ | |
NetInfo | |
LDAP | |
User and Service Config | |
/private/var/db/dslocal | |
Directory Services | |
400 | share points |
AFP, SMB, FTP | |
401 | Trash and Deleted Files |
.Trashes, ~.Trash, private/var/root.Trash | |
/Volumes | |
402 | OpenBSM |
Audit Explorer | |
App Store | |
/etc/security | |
403 | vim/vi execution “trick” |
404 | airportd |
aosnotifyd | |
pboard | |
sharingd | |
spindump_agent | |
Spindump | |
405 | /usr/share/sandbox |
system and application log locations * | |
406 | Highlighter |
Apple System Log (ASC) | |
syslog facilities | |
407 | ASL log: /private/var/log/asl |
.asl files | |
viewing .asl files w/ syslog command | |
408 | LogStash |
sawmill | |
Splunk | |
carving logs with grep, sed, awk, … | |
praudit -a | |
413 | cron, launchd, rc, … |
Launch Agents, Launch Daemons | |
414 | Bonjour |
zero configuration networking | |
iChat | |
415 | application installers |
bill of materials: BOM | |
AutoDesk AutoCAD | |
416 | * sources of investigative material * |
422 | Application Data in DFIR |
423 | Program Files directory |
Documents and Settings | |
ProgramData / AppData | |
Uninstall registry keys * | |
HKLM\SOFTWARE, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node | |
424 | Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) |
425 | rpm -qa –queryformat |
dpkg –get-selections | |
yum, rpm, dpkg, apt | |
Knoppix | |
dpkg.log | |
VirtualBox | |
426 | how to investigate an application |
428 | PuTTY |
PuTTY registry location * | |
RegShot | |
429 | investigating web browsers |
430 | Internet Evidence Finder |
NirSoft BrowsingHistoryViewer | |
431 | Spyglass |
Internet Explorer registry * | |
432 | Internet Explorer filesystem * |
Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) database | |
Index.dat - libmsiecf | |
ESE detail - libesedb | |
433 | Index.dat locations * |
434 | Windows Search Index, LDAP, Exchange use ESE databases |
435 | IE History |
WebCache db | |
IE Cache | |
436 | IE Cookies |
NirSoft IE tools * | |
437 | esenutil /p <file> - repair ESE db |
Google Chrome paths * | |
438 | Chrome History SQL query |
Chrome Cache | |
439 | Chrome Cookies, Downloads, Autofill |
WebKit | |
441 | Chrome forensics tools * |
Mozilla Firefox | |
442 | Mozilla file locations * |
443 | History, moz_places |
Downloads, moz_downloads | |
445 | Firefox forensics tools* |
email clients | |
MIME | |
email headers | |
spear phishing | |
446 | email forensic tools * |
webmail: OWA, Gmail, Hotmail, … | |
447 | webmail forensics links * |
448 | Outlook file locations * |
449 | Office friendly/short versions * |
Outlook profile registry locations * | |
PST, OST | |
libpff | |
450 | pffinfo.exe |
452 | Apple Mail |
453 | Apple Mail filesystem * |
Outlook for Mac | |
454 | Aid4Mail |
Emailchemy | |
Instant Messaging | |
453 | SOAP |
456 | Skype paths * |
459 | Skype forensics tools * |
Facebook chat | |
461 | AIM - AOL Instant Messenger |
466 | malware triage |
dangers of malware triage | |
setting up virtual machines for malware analysis | |
470 | dangers of interacting with attacker infrastructure |
471 | hacking back |
CFAA | |
473 | static analysis |
474 | md5deep |
DigestIt2004 | |
WinMD5 | |
looking up hash info * | |
475 | looking up file info * |
file headers / magic | |
476 | file command |
010 Editor | |
479 | strings |
480 | MAP - Malcode Analyst Pack |
482 | malware: hard-coding, obfuscation, encoding, … |
483 | PeID |
485 | PeView |
CFF Explorer | |
.NET | |
486 | dependency walker |
packed files | |
487 | OllyDbg, plugins |
498 | dynamic analysis |
sandbox | |
490 | getting malware to run, rundll32.exe |
491 | ProcMon |
monitoring malware at runtime | |
500 | report writing |
why write reports | |
501 | reporting standards |
502 | “Improving your technical writing skills” - Norman Fenton |
University of London | |
active voice | |
past tense | |
504 | export reports |
expert witness | |
505 | report content and organizations |
report templates | |
508 | quality assurance |
“The Elements of Style” - Strunk and White | |
514 | remediation |
515 | remediation process, high level |
517 | incident severity |
519 | HIPAA, PII, PHI |
notification requirements for breaches | |
520 | MTTR - Mean Time to Remediate |
eradication | |
remediation team | |
stakeholder | |
525 | Industrial Control Systems (ICS) |
Subject Matter Expert (SME) | |
524 | remediation timing |
Automated Clearing House (ACH) | |
526 | remediation posture |
528 | implications of alerting the attacker |
attackers changing TTPs | |
attackers going dormant | |
529 | attackers becoming destructive |
containment | |
532 | eradication, eradication planning |
537 | eradication “strike zone” |
540 | cleaning vs rebuilding |
541 | strategic recommendations |
542 | lessons learned |
550 | common remediation mistakes |