incidentresponse-luttgens2014

0001-01-01

Incident Response & Computer Forensics, Third Edition

by Jason T. Luttgens, Matthew Pepe, Kevin Mandia

McGraw-Hill Education

ISBN: 978-0-07-179869-6

Page Notes
Tandy 1000SX
Mandiant
industrial espionage
data theft
Jed Mitten
Highlighter log analysis tool
NASA
computer forensics
incident response
research and development
forensics
9/11
USAF
Office of Special Investigations (OSI)
DoD - Computer Forensics Laboratory
Linthicum, Maryland
expert witness
18th Communications Squadron
Kadena Air Base
Okinawa, Japan
George Mason University
computer science
Matthew Pepe
AFOSI
Pentagon
subject matter expert
Foundstone
Trident Data Systems
Sytex
SCSI, SCSI terminator
Kevin Mandia
Chief Operating Officer (COO)
FireEye
7th Communications Group; The Pentagon
Ernst and Young
Washington
Lafayette College
Master’s Degree, Bachelor’s Degree
The George Washington University
Marshall Heilman
information security
security assessment
high tech crime
staff sergeant
USMC
Ryan Kazanciyan
penetration testing
public sector, private sector
law enforcement
red team
Windows
Unix
economics
Duke University
Curtis W. Rose and Associates
Columbia, Maryland
litigation
intrusion response
“Real Digital Forensics: Computer Security and Incident Response”
“Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigations”
“Malware Forensics Field Guide for Windows Systems”
“Malware Forensics Field Guide for Linux Systems”
“Malware Forensics: Investigating and Analyzing Malicious Code”
“SQL Server Forensic Analysis”
“Anti-Hacker Toolkit”
“Network Security: The Complete Reference”
xv incident response has changed significantly
incident response used to be a “three to ten host problem”
attack surface
smash and grab
attackers are more patient in 2014 than 2004
dwell time: months to years
reconnaissance
“attackers know the network as well as the IT department”
nation state
cybercrime
credit card
PII
attackers and defenders have evolved
visibility
enterprise-wide
intrusions have global and economic impact
Google
SVP
Chief Legal Officer
David Drummond
xvi China
stock price impact due to incident disclosure
Baidu
preparation is the most important part of incident response
tricks of the trade
tools of the trade
“Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel”
James R. Butler
BlackHat
Steve Surdu
Kris Kendall
Ken Bradley
Jed Mitten
Chuck Willis
Kris Harms
Bred Padres
Ben Rubin
Nicholas Harbour
David Ross
Tony Dell
Charles Coe
Greg Dominguez
Richard Wilkinson
Marshall Heilman
Ryan Kazanciyan
Jeff Hamm
Juston Prosco
Willi Ballenthin
Ryan Benson
Nikes Akens
Robert Honnies
Barry Grundy
Danny Mares
James Akers
John Beers
Brandi Shailer
Amanda Russell
Amy Jollymore
xix Ponemon Institute
cost of cybercrime in 2013
average cost of an incident: $1 million
average time to resolve an incident: 32 days
CIO
xx malware triage
evidence
remediation
report writing
future proof
incidents are invevitable
detection
data collection
xxi Microsoft Windows
Apple OS X
4 organizations are complacent/reckless in regards to cybercrime
cost of doing business
Carl Sagan
CSRC - Computer Security Resource Center
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
NIST Special Publication 800-61
event definition: “any observable occurrence in a system or network”
incident definition: “violation or threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices”
email spam
embezzlement
5 Xbox
USDOJ
Cornell University
“What is Incident Response”
6 case study
ACL - Access Control List
Java
malware
sophisticated attacker
hashing
digital certificate
persistence mechanism
7 live response
storage and the nature of computer systems has changed how incident response is performed
CIA triad
public relations
Hippocrates
8 why care about incident response?
cryptography
scope
cyber espionage
VPN
9 SQL injection
DMZ
xp_cmdshell stored procedure
local administrator privileges
backdoor
cracking password hashes
keylogger
domain controller
antivirus evasion
10 tunneling
RDP
command and control
DLL search order hijacking
DNS C2 traffic
proxy
attacking sysadmins
file share enumeration
“juicy” file shares
credential theft
data exfiltration
FTP
11 Zip, RAR, CAB files
compression
jump server
Payment Card Industry (PCI)
CVV/CVV2
black market
credit card fraud
12 Domain Administrator (DA)
extracting password hashes from memory
Internet
port 88
mail exchanger
13 Sysinternals PsSuite
pslist
memory dump
RAR - multipart
PCI Data Security Standard (DSS)
Point of Sale (PoS)
tokenization
end-to-end encryption (E2EE)
14 process injection
regular expression
track2 data
hashing to prevent data duplication
RC4
hard-coded key
malware killswitch/mutex
sysadmin noticed strange traffic on port 80 to a foreign country
initial triage
containment
eradication
network traffic analysis
15 PE, ELF
spear phishing
PDF
Adobe Acrobat vulnerabilities
Gh0stRAT
RAT
16 2FA - Two Factor Authentication
attacker determined user was an engineer, worked from home, and enumerated installed software
mimikatz
backup access/multi-tiered persistence
Security Event Log - actual hostname and IP of attacker
VPN pool
geolocation
Texas
Outlook Web Access (OWA)
17 attacker modified file ACLs
local admin password reuse across environment
Windows defrag tool as anti-forensics
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
users logging in from multiple IPs/hosts as a detection
IP address as attacker attribution/scoping incident
enterprise-wide password reset
18 recursive directory listing
19 attack lifecycle
20 initial compromise
social engineering
public-facing vulnerabilities
establishing a foothold
shellcode
attackers downloading extra tools
privilege escalation
pass the hash (PtH)
internal reconnaissance
21 lateral movement
network shares as lateral movement
Task Scheduler lateral movement
PsExec lateral movement
radmin lateral movement
RDP, Dameware, VNC lateral movement
maintaining persistence
webshell
backdooring legitimate applications
22 hindsight is 20/20
24 preparing for an incident
most incident responses are non-technical
core principles of incident response are the same as non-technical investigations
buzzword
marketing hype
what is a security incident
importance of scoping an incident response
organizations need to define what a “computer security incident” means to them
vulnerability scan
act of god
25 backup media
phone
printer
building access card
2FA token
tablet
computers are everywhere
extortion
spyware
goals of incident response
damage assessment
26 who is involved in the incident response process?
CISO
CIO
incident manager
incident commander
27 security posture
European Union (EU)
PCI, HIPAA, FISMA, NERC
28 finding incident response talent
cost of maintaining an incident response team
outsourcing
Fortune 50
29 hiring incident response talent
LinkedIn
Forensic Focus message board
30 network traffic analysis
artifact
log file analysis
need to write well for reports
sandbox
certifications with periodic re-testing
31 the incident response process: initial response, investigation, remediation
leads
CFO
banking trojan
incident response will look different based on the circumstances
32 “Maybe its best not to act quickly”
33 “shiny objects”
34 characteristics of good leads: relevant, detailed, actionable
IoC pronunciation: eye-oh-see
OpenIOC
Cybox
Yara
MITRE
35 Visual Basic
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
Snort
Redline
lack of enterprise-grade or mature solutions for IoC formatting
36 systems of interest
initial triage: validate, categorize, prioritize
false positive
37 evidence preservation
imaging
volatile data
live response
memory collection
volume of data may be prohibitive
rootkit
38 limits of memory analysis
forensic disk imaging
39 “CSI effect”
40 posturing: extra steps taken with remediation to ensure the success of remediation
tactical remediation
strategic remediation
tracking investigative data and information
41 lists: collected evidence, impacted systems, files of interest, accessed and stolen data, attacker activity, IoCs, ongoing tasks and asks
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
RTIR - bestpractical.com
42 reporting
46 big data
identifying risk
policies conducive towards successful incident response
47 corporate reputation
48 Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
security policy
remote access policy
Internet usage policy
privacy
SANS
ISO 27002:2005
Service Level Agreement (SLA)
49 privacy and labor regulations
team coordination: timezones, handoffs
user education
awareness training
50 FTP
51 attackers eavesdropping on incident response communication
COMSEC
email encryption: S/MIME, PGP
data labeling and classification
52 monitor conference call participants
case numbers
project codenames
IDS
voicemail
public relations
53 deliverables
54 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute
Perdue University College of Technology
Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute
incident response team hardware
full disk encryption
self-encrypting drive
TrueCrypt
McAfee Endpoint Protection
55 USB thumb drive
SATA
laptop
56 virtual machines for analysis
PATA, SCSI, SAS, eSATA
write blocker
mobile device forensics equipment
UPS
rack mount
Torx bit
spudger
specialized case opening tools
57 FreeBSD, Linux
SecurityOnion
Easy-IDS
58 forensically sound
Frye test
case law
Daubert vs. Merell-Dow Pharmaceuticals
Kumho Tire Co et all vs. Carmichael et all
Doubert standard
59 Backtrack, CAINE, Helix
boot disk: CD, USB, …
live media
operating system
virtual machine snapshots
NIST Computer Forensic Tool Testing
60 evidence handling
MD5
internal knowledge repository
search engine
61 server, desktop, laptop
62 DISA STIGs
HIPS
asset management
63 provision date
database
MAC
DHCP
64 HP-UX
whitelisting/allowlisting, blacklisting/blocklisting
mass password change difficulties
65 NTLM
LanMan
rainbow table
fgdump
rcracki_mt
registry key
instrumentation
event, error, and access logs
where are the logs? what’s in the logs?
logging and timezones
Splunk
ELSA
Snare - InterSect Alliance
NTSyslog
ArcSight
RSA enVision
66 log retention
logon and logoff events
size of log files
forwarding logs to a centralized log collector
DNS query logging
DHCP lease assignment logs
antivirus, IDS, and firewall logs
custom application logs
67 quarantine
sending malicious or unknown samples to a security vendor
be wary of submitting samples to antivirus sites
Access Data Enterprise
Guidance Software enCase Enterprise
Mandiant Intelligent Response
rolling your own tools
68 patching
remove local administrator permissions from users
ensure security software is deployed and functioning as intended
decommission EOL devices and systems
NSA IA mitigation guidence
network segmentation
network documentation
69 ERP - Enterprise Resource Planning
NAC - Network Access Control
71 Microsoft RPC
VLAN
LDAP
Active Directory
IMAPS, HTTPS
network switch
72 JSON
database replication
73 defense in depth
sensor
fault tree analysis
limiting workstation communication
edge, switching devices
74 border router
proxy-aware malware
default route
honeypot
routing blackhole
penetration test
incident response tabletop
MPLS
75 router
network configuration change control and revision control
full content capture
SPAN
network tap
static route
76 NetFlow emitter
FBI
DNS blackhole
zone file
77 packet capture
BIND
82 Alexander Pope
Hurricane Sandy
NYSE
detection
Ferris Bueller’s Day Off
84 local time
UTC
difficulties with time zones and incident response
using UTC is the best
incident response checklists
checklist
84 RTIR - Request Tracker for Incident Response
Microsoft Active Directory Forest
Incident Summary Checklist:
- time and date of report
- time and date of detection
- contact info of reporter
- contact info of responder
- contact info of person who detected the incident
85 - nature of incident
- how it was detected
- identifiers and locations of affected systems
- who accessed systems after detection
- who is aware of the incident?
- is the incident ongoing?
- who needs to know?
often, checklists “solve” an incident by simply filling it out and being thorough
skepticism
89 case notes
90 timelines, attack timelines, incident timelines
91 proof, legal context
elements of proof
92 setting expectations
93 warez
win.ini
/etc/hosts
96 artifact
leads of value, definition
97 NAT
brittle lead
MD5
98 mutex
registry key
exes in \Windows\Help\
99 XML
100 “Practical Malware Analysis”
host-based indicator
102 packer
manual function import
loose attribution
103 sethc.exe replacement attack (Sticky Keys)
104 pseudo code
105 Image File Execution Options (IFEO)
106 network-based indicator
107 DNS cache
RFC 1035
108 QNAME
Snort
case-insensitive
109 tcpdump
Windows XP
Wireshark
NAT
URL
111 dropper
Microsoft Word
staged malware
112 MRU registry key
“Data Common to Environment”
113 Perl
resolving internal and external leads
114 subpoena
legal discovery
reporting incidents to law enforcement
State Department
115 Infraguard
FS-ISAC
DIB-CS/IA
118 triage imaging
phishing
119 trust but verify
SQL
WWWWWH
120 gathering preliminary evidence
registry keys, files, etc related to malware
network artifact
independent evidence sources
Windows Prefetch
121 determining course of action
123 advanced query monitoring - databases
insider threat
packet capture
124 SQL query
spam
125 DHCP
DHCP logs, DNS query logs
126 misconceptions of insider threats
127 corporate spyware
128 witch hunt
Automated Clearing House (ACH)
fraud
CEO, CFO
online banking
MAC address
conference room
wireless network
unauthorized banking transfer
129 Zeus banking malware
recently installed executables
136 live data collection
live response (LR)
full drive duplication
RFC 3227 - Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
when to perform live response
137 live response pitfalls
USB drive
DOS batch script
Microsoft DOS
138 bash script
BSD
selecting live response tools
139 CSV, TSV, XML
140 marketing propaganda
what should a live response tool collect?
141 collection best practices
143 access control
air gapping
root user
sudo
Windows Vista
Windows 7
UAC
Run As Administrator
CD-ROM, DVD
SMB, CIFS, NFS
144 cryptcat
Apple OS X
automation decreases human error
automation can be worse than human error
being keylogged while carrying out incident response
145 Mandiant Redline
Windows Server 2003
Windows Server 2008
live collection can be expensive in both costs and resources
146 MSI
Redline Collector
148 32 and 64 bit versions of tools
149 systeminfo
net user
net group
ipconfig /all
route print
arp -a
ipconfig /displaydns
netstat -aln
Diamond CS openports
autoruns
pslist
logparser
Nirsoft DriverView
Nirsoft OpenedFilesView
PC-Tools md5sums
hashutils
150 MS-DOS
VBScript
Perl
Python
interpreted language
checksum
memory collection
151 full memory dump
AccessData FTK Imager Lite
Mantech MDD
Mandiant Memoryze
Moonsols Windows Memory Toolkit
msiexec
incident response OPSEC
MemoryDD.bat
154 Microsoft userdump
Microsoft procdump
Ntsecurity.nu pmdump
ProcessDD.bat
155 LINRes
Network Intelligence India
overhead of maintaining Unix live response toolkits
156 The Apple Examiner
date command
dpkg –get-selections
Debian
RPM
rpm -qa
BSD pkg_info
OSX: /Library/Receipts/InstallHistory.plist
mount command
df
fdisk -l
cat /etc/issue
uname -a
w command
cron
/var/spool/cron
init system
uptime
kernel version
installed software
157 services
/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow
/etc/group
ifconfig -a
netstat -rn
arp -a
lsmod
kldstat
kexstat
lsof
ps auxwwwem
/etc
/var/log
/var/adm
/Private/var/log
.bash_history
shell history
find command
md5 command
md5sum command
158 IRIX
Solaris
dd
ddfldd
/dev/mem
LKM
LiME - Linux Memory Extractor
Ubuntu, CentOS, Debian, openSUSE
PDF
159 tarball
Linux kernel headers
insmod
netcat file transfer
160 FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD
dc3dd
BSD ports
pkg_add
sysctl
EOF
hw.physmem64
161 4kb chunks for performance
NFS share
Memoryze for Mac
Mac Memory Reader
ATC-NY
162 /proc/PID/mem
gcore
core dump
gdb
166 forensic duplication
simple duplication
167 SSD
hard drive sector
Host Protected Area
Drive Configuration Overlay (DCO)
SSD load leveling
SSD error detection
NIST - Computer Forensics Tools Verification
CFTT
forensic image formats
168 complete disk image
OEM
Dell
HP
RAID
partition
169 SEC filing
MacBook Pro
attacker downgrading OS and software as anti-forensics
170 partition image
slack space
unallocated space
logical image
NAS
SAN
171 FTK Imager
enCase
VMX, VMDK, VMSS files
image integrity
bad sector
hard drive firmware
AFF format - Advanced Forensic Framework
Expert Witness Format (EWF)
ASR Data SMART
MD5, SHA1
172 E01 files - enCase
Andrew Rosen
173 traditional duplication; computer powered off
hardware write blocker
ASIC
174 SATA, PATA, FireWire, eSATA
WibeTech Forensic UltraDock
175 mounting read only may still alter data on the drive
replaying journals
repairing inconsistencies
176 DCFL
DC3 - Defense Cyber Crime Center
Backtrack
Ultimate Boot CD
POSIX
/mnt
177 auto mount
diskarbitrationd
178 live system duplication
risks of live duplication
mSATA
180 MacBook Air
ZIF ribbon connector
PowerBook
Target Disk Mode
ThunderBolt
Tableau LLC
181 duplicating virtual machines
memory snapshots of virtual machines
184 SPAN
network monitoring
egress point monitoring
tactical sensor
185 Sourcefire
Snort
RSA NetWitness
NIDS
event-based alert
Suricata
186 too many rules may bog down NIDS systems
Snort output plugins
alert_fast
ASCII
Mandiant APT1 report
fake SSL certificate
187 header logging, full packet logging
raw packets
tcpdump
199 W Richard Stevens TCP/IP Illustrated
Ethernet frame
IPv4 header
TCP header
statistical modeling
NetFlow
Fluke
HP
SolarWinds
IBM
argus
flow-tools
189 ragraph Argus command
191 laptops or 1U servers as network monitoring hardware
192 appropriate hardware for network monitoring
Solera Networks
193 NTOP
PF_RING
AF_PACKET
“Comparing and Improving Current Packet Capturing Solutions Based on Commodity Hardware” 2010
“Packet Capture in 10-Gigabit Ethernet Environments Using Contemporary Commodity Hardware” 2007
DeepSea appliance
SecurityOnion
194 Xubuntu
ISO image
195 choke point
VLAN trunking
VLAN tag
IPSec
MPLS
Tripwire
196 evaluating network sensors
C, Lua
Wireshark decoder
198 Wireshark statistics
ftp-data port 20
199 Wireshark “Follow Stream”
extracting files from FTP packet captures with Wireshark
204 fgdump password dump tool
205 MySQL
Apache
SQL injection
SSL decryption with Wireshark
208 sqlmap User-Agent
209 net view
tasklist /v
tree command
210 attacker adding a user
attacker adding user to Administrators group
211 nmap
NetWitness Investigator
213 collecting logs from network events
chain of custody
216 DHCP RFC 2131
217 Microsoft DHCP
Microsoft Technet
218 %WINDIR%\System32\Dhcp\
Server 2012
219 Server 2003 R2
DHCP enabled by default
DhcpSrvLog<day>.log
ISC DHCP
syslog, syslog-ng, rsyslog
DHCPDISCOVER
DHCPOFFER
/etc/syslog.conf, /etc/rsyslog.conf, /etc/syslogng.conf
220 DNS: RFC 1034, RFC 1035
parked hostnames
221 localhost 127.0.0.1
ISC Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND)
named.conf.local
query logging with BIND
IPv6 AAAA
222 ANSWER section
Microsoft DNS
Debug Logging - query logging
223 %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\Dns\dns.txt
truncated on reset or overflow
224 DNSCAP
LANDesk
Symantec Altiris Client Management Suite
Software License Monitoring (SLM)
226 LANDesk registry keys
SOFTWARE hive
REG_BINARY
REG_SZ
REG_DWORD
Python script for converting LANDesk timestamps
227 SLM Browser
RegRipper - landesk.pl
Justin Prosco
Willi Ballenthin - Python registry library
Windows Recycle Bin
228 Application Metering
search for suspicious executions of net.exe. net1.exe, cmd.exe, at.exe, …
TSU
AeXAMInventory.txt
230 antivirus quarantine
Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP)
logfile location
233 SEP quarantine location
VBN extension
QExtract
pyqextract.py - Jamaal Speights
XOR: 0x5a, 0xa5
McAfee Virus Scan Enterprise
234 log locations
McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO)
235 McAfee Virusscan quarantine location
BUP extension
OLE file format
OLECF
7-Zip
hex editor
McAfee FileInsight
236 Trend Micro Office Scan
log file: pccnt35.log
238 VSEncode.exe
hacktivist
IIS
239 HTTP RFC 2616
virtual host
240 Apache
241 Apache config and log locations
access.log
CustomLog, ErrorLog directives
content locations: DocumentRoot
X-Forwarded-For
Apache Common Log Format
NSCA extended/combined log
242 Microsoft IIS
config location
Windows NT 3.51 SP3
IIS Express
243 IIS log locations
W3C Extended Log File Format
UTF-8 Unicode
IIS7
244 database server
245 MS-SQL, MySQL, Oracle
“SQL Server Forensic Analysis” Kewie Fowler
databases are fragile and brittle
246 MSSQL Server Management Studio (SSMS)
MSSQL log locations
247 .mdf, .ldf file formats
MySQL config locations, log locations
my.cnf, my.conf
query logging has unreasonable overhead
248 MyISAM
InnoDB
Oracle SQL server configuration, log locations
254 Neil deGrasse Tyson
scientific method
255 fallacy of proving negatives
256 .pst file
technology changes fast, but fundamentals change slowly
257 PDA
location of data
virtual desktop
258 backups
Carbonite, Mozy, Dropbox. Google Drive
NTFS, HFS+
plist file
NTFS stream
VFS inode
HFS resource fork
File Allocation Table FAT16 FAT32
“File System Forensic Analysis” - Brian Carrier
259 data handling policy
260 Credent full disk encryption
FDE - Full Disk Encryption
261 FUSE
uu encoding
265 NSRL
268 string/keyword searching
foremost
file carving
269 sanity check
273 dead disk forensics
MFT - Master File Table
274 Windows Explorer
$MFT
512 byte sectors
MFT entry
%LogFile
Active/Inactive flag (NTFS)
$STANDARD_INFORMATION
$FILENAME
$DATA
advanced format (AF)
FILE_RECORD_SEGMENT_HEADER
275 identifying deleted files
276 MACE timestamps
$SIA, $SI
STANDARD_INFORMATION
FNA, $FN, FILE_NAME
277 Sleuth Kit
Entry Modified timestamp
filename created
MS-DOS 8.3 filename
time stomping
anti-forensics, counter-forensics
SetMACE
278 $FN MACE is difficult to do without direct MFT access
raw disk access
double time stomping
Windows Vista
279 files copied from media may preserve timestamps
SANS DFIR posters
contiguous data
fragmented data
resident data
280 MFT entry: 1024 bytes
ADS - Alternate Data Streams
dir /r
type command and ADS
281 Poison Ivy backdoor
SysInternals streams
LADS - Frank Heyne
282 X-Ways Forensics
Zone.Identifier
MSDN - “Known Alternate Stream Names”
mft2csv
analyzeMFT
Plaso
log2timeline
INDX attributes
283 B+ tree
$130
INDEX_ROOT
INDEX_ALLOCATION
INDX - 4096 byte chunks
physical size vs logical size
%TEMP%
working directory
284 “Striking Gold Incident Response NTFS INDX Buffers” - Mandiant
INDXParse
285 NTFS Change Logs
journaled file system
$Logfile
$UsnJrnl
$LogFile - typically 64Mb
USN - Update Sequence Number
\$Extend\$UsnJrnl
Index/Search Service
File Replication Service
286 fsutil
LogFileParser
TZWorks Journal Parser
parser-usnjrnl
Volume Shadow Copies - VSC
NT Backup Service
System Restore Point
287 default VSC snapshot size: 5% of volume size on Windows 7, 16% on Vista+
system restore scheduled tasks
registry hive
vssadmin list shadows /for=VolumeLetter
mklink /D target_dir shadow_copy_volume
libvshadow
Shadow Explorer
VSCToolkit
288 WoW64
File System Redirector
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\
%SYSTEMROOT%\SysWOW64\
Microsoft Developer Network
289 Program Files
Prefetch
Windows Cache Manager
%SYSTEMROOT%\Prefetch\
.pf extension
Layout.ini
290 C:\Windows\Prefetch\
SyperFetch
AgAppLaunch database
https://blog.rewolf.pl/blog/?p=214
291 HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PreFetchParameters
enabling Prefetcher
hashing AppList
dllhost.exe
mmc.exe
rundll32.exe
Hexacorn - Prefetch Hash Calculator
292 NTOSBOOT Prefetch file
“10 second rule”
NirSoft WinPrefetchView
bulk acquisition of Prefetch in investigations
293 Last Run Time
Last Modified Time
Forensics Wiki
TZWorks Prefetch Parser
RedWolf Forensics Prefetch Parser
294 Event Logs
Application, System, Security
XP/2003: %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\Config
.evt, .evtx extensions
295 Vista+: %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\WinevtLogs
AppLocker, UAC, Terminal Services logs
EIDS
https://www.myeventlog.com
https://www.eventid.net
296 Logon events
Logon Types: 2: interactive, 3: network, 4: batch, 6: service, 6: proxy, 7: unlock, 8: network cleartext, 9: new credentials, 10: remote interactive, 11: cache interactive
298 LogonProcess: NtlmSsp, Kerberos, User32, Advapi
Authentication Package: NTLM, Negotiate, Kerberos
Workstation Name
Source Network Address
VNC
lateral movement
299 Event ID 4688
301 Process Tracking, Detailed Tracking, Process Auditing
GPO
302 Volume of 4688 events
Maximum Security Event Log setting
SCM - Service Control Manager
PsExec
Event IDs 7035, 7036
Windows Credential Editor
hash replay
antivirus alerts in Event Logs
Event Viewer
FixEVT
304 PsLogList
Log Parser - SQL queries on Event Logs
Event Log Explorer
LfLe
python-evtx
Plaso
305 Event Logs are UTC, Event Viewer is local time
Scheduled Tasks
Task Scheduler
at.exe
schtasks.exe
Management Console snap-in
attackers use scheduled task to avoild using helpers such as psexec
at.exe usage
306 at.exe on remote systems
at.exe runs tasks as SYSTEM
at.exe privesc
deleting at jobs
307 schtasks.exe usage
.job files
%SYSTEMROOT%\Tasks\
Vista+ dont delete .job files on success, but are cleared when Task Scheduler restarts or the system reboots
Task Scheduler log locations: 2000,2003,XP: %SYSTEMROOT%\SchLgU.txt, Vista+: %SYSTEMROOT%\Tasks\SchedLgU.txt
Task Scheduler Event Logs: Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler%4Operational
wevtutil - enable Task Scheduler logs
308 analyzing .job files
jobparser.py - Jamie Levy
310 timestamps of .job files - last execution
Registry Key timestamps
311 cscript.exe
cmd.exe to execute files obfuscation
312 Event IDs: 10, 140, 319, 100, 200, 129, 201, 202
313 Windows Registry
registry key, value, hive
314 registry live locations: SYSTEM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE_SAM, DEFAULT, NTUSER.DAT, USRCLASS.DAT
315 Cygwin
regedit.exe
reg.exe
316 registry hive mappings: HKLM, HKU, HKCU, HKCC, HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT
SID - Security Identifier
CurrentControlSet
317 registry timestamps
registry subkey
no created or accessed timestamps!
keys only! not values
Last Write Time
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
runkeys as persistence
caveats of LastWriteTime
318 SetRegTime - Joakim Schicht
Registry Reflection
Registry Redirection
Wow6432Node
“Registry Keys Affected by View64” - MSDN
319 “Registry Reflection” - MSDN
System Configuration registry keys
ShimCache
common autorun registry keys
user hive registry keys
Control Panel
320 table of registry entries
322 “How to Determine Audit Policies From the Registry”
“Well-Known SIDs”
ShimCache/Application Compatibility Cache
registry location of ShimCache: XP, Vista+
advantages of ShimCache over Prefetch
323 “Leveraging the Application Compatibility Cache in Forensics Investigations”
Andrew Davis
ShimCacheParser.py
Mandiant ShimCache whitepaper
324 there are hundreds of autorun keys
autostart extensitility points
persistence mechanism keys
Windows Services
Local System, Network Service, Local Service
325 HLKM\CurrentControlSet\Service\<Servicename>
* Microsoft Service Key value documentation *
326 svchost.exe
ServiceMain
ServiceDLL
ImagePath
327 sc query
sq queryex
sc start, stop, create
* sc.exe documentation *
Service Management snapin services.msc
328 sc/Service Manager do not allow editing of ServiceDLL; use regedit.exe
tasklist /svc
Volatility Framework
Run, RunOnce keys
* common locations *
329 Active Setup
Windows 98
* registry key locations *
malware re-using GUIDs with Active Setup
Googling GUIDs
StubPath - Active Setup
PoisonIvy using Active Setup persistence
331 AppInit_DLLs
user32.dll
* registry locations *
Windows 7+ requires signed AppInit_DLLs
LSA Packages
Local Security Authority (LSA)
* registry locations *
malware doesnt need to implenent LSA functionality
msv1_0 - NTLM local and domain
Kerberos
wdigest - digest authentication
tspkg - Terminal Services SSO
notification packages - when passwords are set or changed
FPNWCLNT - File and Print Services for NetWare
RASSFM - Remote Access Subauthentication
KDCSVC - Kerberos Key Distribution Center Service
scecli - Security Configuration Engine Client
* Microsoft Documentation *
332 LSA as persistence
Browser Helper Object (BHO)
Internet Explorer
adware, scamware
COM - Component Object Model
CLSID - Class ID * registry location *
search Google for CLSIDs
IE7+ - Manage Add-Ons
Shell Extensions - “BHOs for Explorer”
333 blacklisting CLSIDs
“Registering Shell Extension Handlers”
WinloginGINA
GinaDLL * registry location *
GINA DLL MiTM
WinLogin Notification * registry location *
winlogin.exe
screen saver
screen lock
WinLoginNotify eliminated in Vista+
334 Winlogin Shell * registry location *
Winlogin Userinit * registry location *
WinLogin persistence
key-value pairs
Identifying Malicious AutoRuns: typos, weird paths, problems with this approach
335 hijacking legitimate services
look for unsigned DLLs/exes
look for timestamps within incident timeline
336 Bit9 File Advisor - known good
malware signing binaries
stolen code signing certificates
338 Shellbags * registry location *
339 shellbags.py
340 Dan Bullega Shellbags blog
“Usint Shellbags information to reconstruct user activities” - Zhu, Gladyshev, James
“Computer Forensic Artifacts Windows 7 Shellbags”
Chad Tillbury
SANS Shellbags blog
TZworks sbag
UserAssist * registry location *
LNK file
Start Menu
Run menu
341 ROT13 - UserAssist
Nirsoft UserAssistView
Didier Stevens - UserAssist
MUI Cache
342 MUICache * registry location *
NirSoft MUICacheView
343 MRU - Most Recently Used keys * registry location *
Explorer Open and Save MRU
ComDlg32
OpenSavePid1MRU
OpenSaveMRU
LastVisitedPid1MRU
344 CIDSizeMRU
Harlan Carvey - RegRipper
Start Menu Run MRU * registry location *
RecentDocs * registry location *
LNK files for recents
345 Internet Explorer TypedURLs/TypedPaths * registry locations *
links, bookmarks
doesn’t track clicks of links or bookmarks
The Digital Forensics Stream Blog
UNC path
346 Remote Desktop MRU * registry location *
Terminal Services / Server Client
347 Windows Registry Decoder
AutoRuns
autorunsc
348 UserAssist - Didier Stevens
349 NirSoft registry tools * link *
350 Recent Documents
LNK file analysis
351 TZWorks lp
Simple File Parser - Google
Jump Lists - added in Windows 7
taskbar
Microsoft Outlook
JumpLister - WoanWare
JumpList file paths
353 analyzing Recycle Bin artifacts
Vista+ changed Recycle Bin format
$I, $R files
INFO2 files
356 Recycle Bin should never contain normal files beyond desktop.ini
rifiutil2
memory forensics
357 page file
physical memory
FIrewire IEEE 1394 - direct memory access
358 page file locations
359 crash dump
kernel memory dump
360 minidump * filesystem locations *
complete memory dump * filesystem locations *
memory.dmp
WIndows Error Reporting * registry *
Moonsols Windows Memory Toolkit
WinDbg
Hibernation Files * filesystem locations *
hiberfil.sys
Volatility image copy plugin
361 memory analysis
EPROCESS blocks - Executive Process
SID to username mapping blog *
362 Handles
SysInternals handle, Process Explorer
Zeus malware
363 mutex/mutant
Zeus usage of mutants
PoisonIvy usage of mutants
364 Virtual Access Descriptor (VAD) trees
Dolan Gavitt VAD blog *
Windows Process Loader
366 crss.exe - Client Server System Runtime
strings in memory
LSASS dump from memory - mimikatz
Pagefile.sys analysis
367 * pagefile registry settings *
process injection
CreateRemoteThread/LoadLibrary
368 hooking
SetWindowsHookEx keylogger
GetAsyncKeystroke keylogger
369 IAT hooking
IDT hooking
SSDT hooking
System Service Dispatch Table
Kernel Patch Protection (KPP)
PatchGuard
Volatility apihooks plugin
HttpSendRequestA
wininet.dll
370 DumpIt
371 Scheduled Tasks persistence
Conficker - unnamed scheduled tasks
.job files
system binary modification
373 Windows File Protection (WFP)
Windows Resource Protection (WRP)
Sticky Keys
IFEO - Image File Execution Options
sethc.exe
Accessibility Features
DLL load order hijacking / search order hijacking
ntshrui.dll persistence
DLL proxying/passthrough
376 * sources of evidence *
382 macOS / Mac OS X
Spotlight
HFS+
383 HFS+ Volume layout
HFS+ Boot Blocks
Finder
System folder
HFS+ Volume Header, Alternative Volume Header
384 iBored
385 Volume Header Structure *
386 GMT time
387 Allocation file, Extents Overflow file, Catalog file, Attributes file, … Startup file
named for
B-tree
CNID - Catalog Node ID
plist format
388 Safari
xattr -lr *
“MDItem reference”
com.apple.metadata
389 Spotlight
Application Bundles
mdfind
Mac OS X Lion
Managed Storage
390 sqlite3
SQLite Manager
392 /Applications, /Developer, /Library, /System
393 /Network, /Users
MacPorts
BSD ports
“File System Programming Guide”
394 /Applications
Application Bundles
.app
.framework
.plugin
.kext
Finder - Show Package COntents
VMWare Fusion
Console
Help Bundle
XCode
397 plutil
/System domain
/User domain
398 NeXTStep
Sun NIS+
NetInfo
LDAP
User and Service Config
/private/var/db/dslocal
Directory Services
400 share points
AFP, SMB, FTP
401 Trash and Deleted Files
.Trashes, ~.Trash, private/var/root.Trash
/Volumes
402 OpenBSM
Audit Explorer
App Store
/etc/security
403 vim/vi execution “trick”
404 airportd
aosnotifyd
pboard
sharingd
spindump_agent
Spindump
405 /usr/share/sandbox
system and application log locations *
406 Highlighter
Apple System Log (ASC)
syslog facilities
407 ASL log: /private/var/log/asl
.asl files
viewing .asl files w/ syslog command
408 LogStash
sawmill
Splunk
carving logs with grep, sed, awk, …
praudit -a
413 cron, launchd, rc, …
Launch Agents, Launch Daemons
414 Bonjour
zero configuration networking
iChat
415 application installers
bill of materials: BOM
AutoDesk AutoCAD
416 * sources of investigative material *
422 Application Data in DFIR
423 Program Files directory
Documents and Settings
ProgramData / AppData
Uninstall registry keys *
HKLM\SOFTWARE, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node
424 Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS)
425 rpm -qa –queryformat
dpkg –get-selections
yum, rpm, dpkg, apt
Knoppix
dpkg.log
VirtualBox
426 how to investigate an application
428 PuTTY
PuTTY registry location *
RegShot
429 investigating web browsers
430 Internet Evidence Finder
NirSoft BrowsingHistoryViewer
431 Spyglass
Internet Explorer registry *
432 Internet Explorer filesystem *
Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) database
Index.dat - libmsiecf
ESE detail - libesedb
433 Index.dat locations *
434 Windows Search Index, LDAP, Exchange use ESE databases
435 IE History
WebCache db
IE Cache
436 IE Cookies
NirSoft IE tools *
437 esenutil /p <file> - repair ESE db
Google Chrome paths *
438 Chrome History SQL query
Chrome Cache
439 Chrome Cookies, Downloads, Autofill
WebKit
441 Chrome forensics tools *
Mozilla Firefox
442 Mozilla file locations *
443 History, moz_places
Downloads, moz_downloads
445 Firefox forensics tools*
email clients
MIME
email headers
spear phishing
446 email forensic tools *
webmail: OWA, Gmail, Hotmail, …
447 webmail forensics links *
448 Outlook file locations *
449 Office friendly/short versions *
Outlook profile registry locations *
PST, OST
libpff
450 pffinfo.exe
452 Apple Mail
453 Apple Mail filesystem *
Outlook for Mac
454 Aid4Mail
Emailchemy
Instant Messaging
453 SOAP
456 Skype paths *
459 Skype forensics tools *
Facebook chat
461 AIM - AOL Instant Messenger
466 malware triage
dangers of malware triage
setting up virtual machines for malware analysis
470 dangers of interacting with attacker infrastructure
471 hacking back
CFAA
473 static analysis
474 md5deep
DigestIt2004
WinMD5
looking up hash info *
475 looking up file info *
file headers / magic
476 file command
010 Editor
479 strings
480 MAP - Malcode Analyst Pack
482 malware: hard-coding, obfuscation, encoding, …
483 PeID
485 PeView
CFF Explorer
.NET
486 dependency walker
packed files
487 OllyDbg, plugins
498 dynamic analysis
sandbox
490 getting malware to run, rundll32.exe
491 ProcMon
monitoring malware at runtime
500 report writing
why write reports
501 reporting standards
502 “Improving your technical writing skills” - Norman Fenton
University of London
active voice
past tense
504 export reports
expert witness
505 report content and organizations
report templates
508 quality assurance
“The Elements of Style” - Strunk and White
514 remediation
515 remediation process, high level
517 incident severity
519 HIPAA, PII, PHI
notification requirements for breaches
520 MTTR - Mean Time to Remediate
eradication
remediation team
stakeholder
525 Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Subject Matter Expert (SME)
524 remediation timing
Automated Clearing House (ACH)
526 remediation posture
528 implications of alerting the attacker
attackers changing TTPs
attackers going dormant
529 attackers becoming destructive
containment
532 eradication, eradication planning
537 eradication “strike zone”
540 cleaning vs rebuilding
541 strategic recommendations
542 lessons learned
550 common remediation mistakes

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